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Family-friendly laws may backfire if not all workers with access to the policies use them. 
Because these policies are costly to the employer, hiring practices may consequently be 
affected at the detriment of the at-risk population who may end up accessing the policy. We 
exploit a 1999 Spanish law that granted all workers with children under 7 years the right to 
work part-time. Most importantly, the law declared a layoff invalid if the worker had previously 
asked for a work-week reduction due to family responsibilities. Using a difference-in-
differences (DD) methodology, we first find evidence that the law increased part-time work 
among eligible mothers with a permanent contract, but had no effect on eligible fathers or 
mothers with a temporary contract. This effect is driven by the less-educated women. Then, 
using both a DD and a DDD approach, we analyze the effects of the law among the at-risk 
population, i.e., childbearing-aged women with no children under 7. We find that this policy 
led to the unintended effect of decreasing the likelihood of being employed with a permanent 
contract among the at-risk high-school graduate women (relative to their male counterpart), 
while increasing their relative likelihood of having a fixed-term contract job. These findings 
suggest that, after the law, employers preferred hiring childbearing-aged men under 
permanent contracts (offering fixed-term contracts to childbearing-aged women). 
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I.  Introduction 
In the light of the low fertility trends in many industrialized countries, and given the 
increased relevance of women’s labor force participation and their weight in the 
economic support of their families, the introduction of family-friendly practices have 
recently received renewed attention from policy makers, practitioners and researchers. 
Indeed, many governments in most industrialized countries have adopted policies 
encouraging family-friendly work environments with the objective of promoting gender 
equality in the workplace, and greater quality care for children and dependents.   
However, these policies may backfire if not all workers with access to family-friendly 
policies use them.  Given that these policies are costly for the employer, hiring practices 
may consequently be affected at the detriment of the at-risk population.  In this paper, 
we find evidence that unintended effects may indeed emerge.  
The policy under analysis in this paper is the Spanish Law 39/99, implemented 
on the 5
th of November of 1999, in which the government granted all wage and salary 
workers’ the right to work part-time (PT) if they had children under seven years old.  
The objective of this policy was to facilitate PT work among parents with small 
children, and to protect their jobs in the event they decided to reduce their work-week 
schedule to care for their children.  An important element of this law is that it declared a 
layoff invalid if the worker had previously asked for a work-week reduction due to 
family responsibilities.  However, despite this, the policy de facto only protected 
workers with permanent contracts, since the employers could not be forced to renew 
fixed-term contracts once they expired.   
Using cross-sectional data from the 1994 to 2003 Spanish Labor Force Survey 
(LFS) and a differences-in-differences approach (DD), we first analyze the effectiveness 
of this law in increasing the rate of PT employment among eligible parents.  The 3 
 
analysis is done by gender and type of contract as the law was only binding if the 
worker had a permanent contract.  The analysis compares the likelihood of PT 
employment conditional on working of eligible mothers and fathers (the two treated 
groups) before and after the law.  As comparison groups, we use parents with children 
slightly older than seven.  In addition, we allow for different trends between the treated 
and the comparison groups in case the outcome of interest systematically evolves 
differently for the treatment and the control groups.   
Overall, we find evidence that the law was successful in that it significantly 
increased the rate of PT work among eligible mothers working with a permanent 
contract—that is, those with children under seven—as it almost doubled it.  However, 
the law had no effect on eligible fathers or eligible mothers working with a fixed-term 
contract, corroborating our intuition that, due to economic, social and cultural reasons, 
mainly mothers in the primary labor market access (or are able to use) the policy.   
Heterogeneity analysis reveals that this effect is driven by less-educated women.  In 
fact, no effect is found among college graduates.  
We then proceed to analyze whether the law had any unintended effect on 
employment outcomes of the at-risk population, that is, childbearing-aged women who 
do not have children under seven, using a DD approach.  The analysis is done by 
education level for two reasons.  First, the evidence shows that the policy had 
differential effects across skill groups.  Second, each education level faces a distinct 
labor market.
1  The analysis compares employment outcomes of the at-risk women, 
which we define as women with no children under seven and between 23 and 45 years 
old (the treated group), before and after the law.  As a comparison group, we use men in 
                                                 
1 This is in line with research on the differential effects of motherhood on earnings—see Taniguchi, 1999; 
Todd, 2001; Budig and England, 2001; Anderson et al., 2002; Anderson et al., 2003; Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Kimmel, 2005; Loughren and Zissimopoulus, 2009; Kunze and Kenneth, 2009; and Elwood et al., 
2010. 4 
 
the same age range.  In addition, in an alternative specification older individuals are 
included to control for any possible labor force status changes across genders over time 
(obtaining a DDD estimator).  In both specifications, we allow for different trends 
between the treated and the comparison groups in case the outcome of interest 
systematically evolves differently for the treatment and the control groups. 
Among the at-risk women with a high-school degree, we find that the law 
significantly decreased by 18% the likelihood of being employed with a permanent 
contract, while increasing their likelihood of having a fixed-term contract job by 30%, 
suggesting that, after the law, employers avoided hiring childbearing-aged women 
under permanent contracts.  This is particularly concerning as more than half (55%) of 
women between 23 and 45 years in Spain are high-school graduates, implying that the 
unintended effects of this family-friendly law affected the majority of childbearing-aged 
women. 
Spain is a suitable case to investigate this issue because of the striking 
segmentation of its labor market.  An important dual labor market developed after 
legislation changes in 1984, resulting in the economy with the highest rate of fixed-
term contracts in Europe for the last two decades (over one third of all contracts are 
fixed-term contracts).  This bleak picture of the Spanish labor market—with 
widespread job precariousness, a high unemployment rate, and lack of access to good 
PT jobs—, does not make for a family-friendly country (as discussed by de la Rica and 
Ferrero, 2003; and Esping-Andersen, Güell, and Brodmann, 2007, among others).   
Thus, understanding the intended and unintended effects of such a law on women’s 
employment outcomes is of highest policy relevance. 
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes the 39/1999 law.  
Section III presents the data and the descriptive statistics.  Section IV analyzes the 5 
 
effects of the family-friendly policy on the employment outcomes of the eligible 
population.  Section V analyzes the effects of the family-friendly policy on the 
employment outcomes of the at-risk population.  Section VI concludes.   
 
II.  The 39 / 1999 Law 
On November 5
th, 1999, the Spanish Government passed a law to promote the 
conciliation of work and family life.  This law introduces some very important novelties 
that strengthen the right to flexible work arrangements for certain groups of workers.  In 
particular, it details the conditions under which parents can exercise the right to work 
PT.  As such, it establishes that workers with children under 7 years have the right to 
ask for a reduction of one third to one half of the usual full-time schedule, with an 
equivalent reduction in their salary.
2  This right is extended also to workers with family 
dependents, for reason of physical or mental disability.  The law also establishes that the 
worker has the right to choose the time slot during the day he or she wants to work and 
that the firm has to accept this or go to court.  Most importantly, the law declared a 
layoff invalid if the worker had previously asked for a work-week reduction due to 
family responsibilities, that is, the firm must readmit the worker in his or her previous 
job and cannot use the alternative of dismissing the worker by compensating her with 
the statutory severance payment.   
It is important to note that although this law declared a layoff invalid if the worker 
had previously asked for a work-week reduction or a leave of absence due to family 
responsibilities, it only protected workers with permanent contracts, since employers 
who did not want to offer reduced work hours to workers with fixed-term contracts only 
had to wait for their contract to expire to terminate the employment relationship. De 
                                                 
2 The maximum age of the child was extended from six to eight in 2007. 6 
 
facto, this implies that the law gave rights to reduced work arrangements only to 
workers with permanent contracts.  
Potential Effects of this Family-Friendly Policy 
The objective of the policy was to facilitate the conciliation of work and family life for 
families with children under seven.  However, as explained above, our prior is that this 
law was only binding among workers with permanent contracts.  Moreover, given the 
traditional values of the Spanish society, we suspect that mainly mothers of small 
children would access the policy of requesting reduced work week to care for their 
young child.
3  In contrast, based on anecdotal evidence, we do not expect fathers of 
young children to access the policy.
4  Therefore, we expect the policy to increase the 
rate of PT work among mothers with children under seven working with a permanent 
contract, but not for the other eligible groups (mothers with children under 7 years 
working with a fixed-term contract, and fathers with children under 7 years, regardless 
of their contract type).
5 
We also expect the law to increase employment in the primary segment of the labor 
market (that is, the rate of permanent-contract work) for eligible mothers, because this 
policy protects them against any layoff.  A consequence of this law is that it prevents 
employers from laying-off women once they become mothers if they have requested a 
                                                 
3 Spain is a country with traditional values, in which most people believe that it is optimal for young 
children to spend most of their time during the first few years of their life under their mother’s care (Pfau-
Effinger, 2006).  Despite a recent change in attitudes, child care remains women’s main responsibility, 
and although Spanish men have recently increased the amount of time they spend taking care of their 
children (Larrañaga et al., 2004), there is still a strong asymmetry in the share of childbearing 
responsibilities across gender with women spending, on average, 2.7 more hours per day with their 
children than men (Marí-Klose et al., 2010). 
4 Given that men tend to have higher earnings than women in Spain, the decision to reduce the work 
schedule of the lower earning member of the household is also a rational one. 
5 Other researchers have analyzed the effect of family-friendly programs on the eligible population and 
they have found that: (1) not all workers have equal access to such family-friendly programs (Deitch & 
Huffman, 2001); (2) not all employees are equally aware of benefit availability (see Baird and Reynolds, 
2004; and Budd and Brey, 2003); and (3) not all employees with access to family-friendly policies are 
able to use them as some may not be able to afford part-time work, and others may fear negative reprisals 




work-week reduction.  Moreover, employment in the primary segment of the labor 
market may also increase if mothers—who wanted a reduced work-week to care for 
their children had to (in the absence of the law) quit their permanent job and find 
another one in the secondary labor market—, are now able to retain their permanent 
contract with the reduced work schedule.  No such effect ought to be observed among 
fathers of children under seven if they do not request reduced work-week hours. 
It is uncertain, however, whether overall employment for eligible mothers ought to 
increase after the law.  The reason being that the policy may only lead to a substitution 
between working PT with a fixed-term contract (prior to the law) to working PT with 
permanent contract (after the law).  Whether overall employment increases among 
eligible mothers will depend on the extent to which, mothers who may have decided to 
exit the labor market in the primary labor market in the absence of the policy, are 
induced to remain employed (but with a reduced work schedule) after the family 
friendly policy is implemented. 
In addition, the law could have led to the unintended effect of reducing employment 
in the primary labor market for the at-risk population, that is, childbearing-aged women 
with no children under seven (as the policy does not protect them from a layoff), 
relative to childbearing-aged men (as eligible fathers do not access the new policy 
rights).  If the unintended effect of the law is that employers stop hiring childbearing-
aged women for jobs in the primary labor market, we may see that fixed-term contract 
work increases and permanent contract work decreases for this group relative to other 
groups.   
Finally, we may also observe an increase in employment as new workers need to 
cover the work-week time reductions taken by mothers of young children.  It is unclear 
whether such increase in employment will be observed among childbearing-aged 8 
 
women or other demographic groups, and whether it will be PT work or full-time work 
(or the contract type).  We shall explore all of these effects empirically. 
 
III.  Data 
We use data from the second quarter of the 1994 through 2003 Spanish Labor Force 
Survey (LFS)—we exclude the year 2000 to guarantee a clear cut before and after the 
law.
6  The Spanish LFS is a quarterly cross-sectional dataset collected by the Spanish 
Statistical Office that gathers information on demographic characteristics (such as, age, 
years of education, marital status, and region of residence), employment characteristics 
(such as current work status, current contract type, current usual and effective hours 
worked, current PT status, and labor force status last year), and fertility information 
(births, number and age of children).  We focus our analysis on private sector wage and 
salary workers, and restrict the age of men and women to be between 23 and 64 years 
old. The reason for dropping workers younger than 23 years old is that we want to 
eliminate PT work by students (this age restrictions is not unusual in the PT literature—
see Connolly and Gregory, 2009; or Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas, 
forthcoming).  To avoid capturing the effects of the law on those who cared for 
grandparents, we exclude individuals cohabitating with a grandparent.
7  T h e s e  
restrictions result in a pooled cross-sectional data set with 642,291 observations.   
Detailed descriptive statistics of the different treated and comparison groups will be 
discussed in each of the subsections, after we explain the identification strategy for 
each of the two questions we explore: (1) Whether the law was effective, and (2) 
whether it had unintended effect on the population at-risk of being eligible.  
                                                 
6 As is common practice in the research using this dataset, we only use the second quarter to avoid 
repeated observations.  The LFS is carried out every quarter on a sample of around 60,000 households.  
Each quarter, one sixth of the sample is renewed.  However, the dataset does not include a variable that 
allows identification of individuals along the six consecutive interviews.   
7 Our results are robust to including such group of individuals.  9 
 
IV.  Was the Law Effective on the Eligible Population?  
Identification Strategy 
To analyze whether the law was effective in terms of increasing PT work among parents 
of young children, we estimate whether policy-eligible individuals were more likely to 
work PT after the law than before relative to the observed change in PT work among 
similar individuals not affected by the law.  PT is self-reported in the LFS and usually 
implies working less than 30 hours per week.  Because of the important gender 
differences in the share of PT work in Spain, the analysis in this Section is done 
separately for men and women.  Moreover, because of the deep segmentation of the 
Spanish labor market and the fact that the policy was de facto not binding in the 
secondary labor market, that is, among workers with temporary contracts, the analysis 
will also be done by contract type.
8     
We compare the likelihood of working PT at survey date in each segment of the 
labor market among eligible mothers (or fathers), that is, parents whose youngest child 
was under 7 years after 1999, with the following comparison groups.  For mothers, the 
comparison group is mothers whose youngest child is between 7 and 12 years at survey 
date; for fathers, the comparison group is fathers whose youngest child is between 7 and 
16 years at survey date.  Due to small sample sizes among men working PT, we 
expanded the youngest child’s age interval for fathers.  However, as sample size is not 
an issue for women working PT, we prefer mothers whose youngest child is 7 to 12 
years as the child’s caring needs will resemble more to those of younger children.  To 
guarantee that our control group is not contaminated by the fact that there could be 
parents who are not eligible for the policy at the time of the interview but may have 
been in the past, we exclude from our analysis those individuals from the control group 
                                                 
8 Since the early 1990s, fixed-term employment represents one third of the Spanish labor force (by far, the 
highest share among European countries), 10 
 
who were eligible at some point in the past, even though they are not when we observe 
them at survey date.  We do this because we are concerned that having been eligible for 
the law may affect their labor force status later on (once the individual is no longer 
eligible).  Moreover, to guarantee that both groups are similar in terms of age, we 
restrict all men and women in our treatment and comparison groups to be less than 45 
years old, which covers most childbearing years.
9  Sensitivity analysis with alternative 
children’s or parents’ age groups provides similar results as those shown below.  We 
allowed for different trends (and their square) between the treated and the comparison 
groups in case the outcome of interest systematically evolves differently for the 
treatment and the control groups, leading to the DD estimator, which compares changes 
in the behavior of the treatment groups with changes for the control groups correcting 
for their different underlying trend.  As Meyer, 1995, pointed out omission of a specific 
trend for the treatment group would bias the estimation of the policy effect.   
The main identification condition for the estimation of the policy effect is that, 
aside from the new law, there are no other shocks in or after the implementation of the 
law that may affect the differential labor supply decision of parents of children 0 to 6 
years relative to parents of children 7 to 12 (net of any underlying trends).  In addition 
to control for province-level unemployment rate and 17 state dummies, we interacted 
such dummies with trend and trend square to control for any potential policy 
interactions at the regional level.
10 
                                                 
9 This restriction reduces by 219 (196) observations the sample of women with a permanent (fixed-term) 
contract, and by 1648 (439) observations the sample of men with a permanent (fixed-term) contract. 
10 In addition, alternative specifications with variables controlling for regional subsidies to permanent 
contracts, regional preschool enrollment rates, and tax deductions based on family size have also been 
estimated and are available in an earlier version of this paper.  Results are robust to these alternative 
specifications. 11 
 
Using a sample with only mothers (fathers) whose youngest child is between 0 
and 12 years (0 and 16 years), we estimate the following linear probability equation for 
the likelihood of working PT in year t:
 11 
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where t indexes the year, and i indexes the individual.  The variables CHILD0-6i is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the individual’s youngest child is under 7 years old, 
that is, the treatment group; the variable AFTERt is a dummy equals 1 after the 
introduction of the policy (0 otherwise); and the variable (CHILD0-6i*AFTERt) is a 
dummy variables equal 1 if the individual is a parent whose youngest child is less than 7 
years after the introduction of the policy, and can be interpreted as the “policy variable”. 
Because the choice of PT work among individuals with small children may differ 
from those with older children, the coefficient α1 captures any such differences.  The 
variable AFTERt controls for any possible changes in the socioeconomic environment 
that occurred simultaneously to the 1999 law and that may have also affected PT 
employment among members of the treatment and comparison groups.  Thus, the 
coefficient α2 captures any differences in PT employment status before and after the 
implementation of the policy (regardless of the age of the individuals’ youngest child).  
To have an estimate of the effect of the policy on young parents’ PT status, we are 
interested on the coefficient of the interaction (CHILD0-6i*AFTERt), α3, as it captures 
the relative change in PT status of mothers (fathers) whose youngest child is under 7 
years relative to the change observed among mothers of 7 to 12 year olds (fathers of 7 to 
16years old) after the policy.  As noted earlier, we include a time trend and its square 
common to all groups and a specific trend and its square for the treatment group.   
                                                 
11 We use linear probability models in all specifications to make our estimation procedure comparable 
throughout.  We have, however, replicated our analysis using logit models and find very similar results.   12 
 
The vector ti X  contains explanatory variables related to socioeconomic and family 
characteristics (such as, age and age square, cohabitation and marital status, a dummy 
indicating whether the individual is the household head, a variable indicating the 
number of children in the household, education dummies, an immigration dummy, a 
dummy indicating whether the individual was working last year, provinces’ 
unemployment rate, 17 region dummies, and these dummies interacted by the time trend 
and its squared). 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows the average annual growth rate for several outcome variables for a 
period of six years before the policy implementation (1994-1999) and for a period of 
three years after the policy (2001-2003).  We distinguish between four groups: mothers 
and fathers with children under 7 (the treated groups); and mothers with children 7 to 
12 years, and fathers with children 7 to 16 years (the comparison groups).  Below, we 
summarize the main findings from Table 1.   
Before the policy, fathers with children under seven had higher employment 
rates (81%) than fathers with children 7 to 16 years (74%).  Women’s employment rate 
at the time was considerably lower, ranging between 24% for mothers with children 
under seven and 28% for mothers of older children.  As expected, we observe an 
increase in both male and female employment rates over the period, as Spain expanded 
economically.  Moreover, such increase was relatively larger for women than for men.  
However, the raw data does not indicate that there is a differential growth pattern 
between parents of children under seven and older parents.  Now shifting our attention 
to the likelihood of working with a permanent contract, it is worth highlighting that 
while more than half of men with children work in the primary labor market, less than 
one fifth of mothers do so.  In addition, the raw data suggest that there is a differential 13 
 
growth pattern between parents of children under seven and older parents in the 
likelihood of permanent employment after the law, with parents of small children 
having a higher likelihood of working under a permanent contract after the law. 
PT work is mainly a women’s job in Spain and it is concentrated in the 
secondary labor market.  While as much as one third of mothers with young children 
working in the secondary labor market prior to the law had a PT job, the share among 
fathers with young children is as low as 4%.  Similarly, in the primary labor market, the 
share of PT is around 17% for mothers and less than 1% for fathers.  After the law, the 
share of PT work increased considerably (by 15%) for mothers of young children in the 
primary labor market (but remained unchanged for the other three groups).  In the 
secondary labor market, the share of PT work increased for all mothers, but more so for 
those with small children representing as much as 40% of those workers.  Caution is 
needed thus far, as this analysis is descriptive and there are systematic socio-
demographic differences across the different groups (also shown in Table 1) that one 
needs to control for.  The multivariate analysis follows. 
Results on Part-Time Employment 
Table 2.A presents the main coefficients of interest from estimating equation (1) for 
women and men, and conditional on working with a permanent and fixed-term contract, 
respectively.  The coefficient of interest is reported in the third row.  It measures the 
effect of the policy on PT work for eligible parents relative to non-eligible parents.  
Focusing first on the results in the first column of Table 2.A we find that, in the primary 
labor market, the rate of PT work among eligible mothers increased by 15.2 percentage 
points after the reform relative to the observed changes in the comparison group- of 
other mothers (net of any underlying trends).  This effect is statistically significant.  
Since the odds of working PT among mothers of children under 7 years with a 14 
 
permanent contract prior to the policy is 16.84%, the law was extremely effective in 
facilitating the conciliation of family and work among women working in the primary 
labor market.  Note that the overall effect of the law on the likelihood of working PT in 
the primary labor market (the sum of α2  and  α3) is a statistically significant 5.9 
percentage points, which implies that after the law, PT among eligible mothers 
increased by 35%. 
As expected, and in contrast with the large effects of the law in the primary labor 
market, no statistically significant policy effect is found in the secondary labor market 
(shown in column 3 of Table 2.A).  Moreover, the size of the coefficient of interest, α3, 
drops considerably, and changes sign.  Similarly, none of the coefficients of the impact 
of the family-friendly policy are statistically significant for men, regardless of the 
segment of the labor market they work in (shown in columns 2 and 4 of Table 2.A). 
Table 2.B presents estimates of the main coefficient of interest, α3, under alternative 
specifications of equation (1).  The second row of Table 2.B presents results from a 
specification without the trend.  In such case, the coefficient, α3, for women working 
with a permanent contract is below 2 percentage points and not statistically significant.  
Adding a linear trend and the linear trend interacted with the treatment group raises the 
coefficient, α3, to a statistically significant 7 percentage points; and adding a quadratic 
form to the trends further raises the coefficient to 15 percentage points.
 12  For all the 
other groups, none of the coefficients are statistically significant.  Results shown in 
Tables 2.A are also robust to dropping data from the 2003 year—in which an important 
                                                 
12 In recent years, Spain has received a massive and unprecedented inflow of female migrants which have 
increased the local availability of household services and reduced their price.  Farré, González, and 
Ortega, 2010, find that this inflow explains the large increase in the employment rate of women with 
family responsibilities.  As daycare for children under three is scarce and expensive in Spain, it is likely 
that this inflow has had a greater effect on mothers of the youngest children, explaining the importance of 
controlling for the trend to prevent biases in our estimates.  15 
 
tax reform took place—, to modifying the age of parents or children in the comparison 
groups, and to conditioning on having worked in the previous year
13   
The estimates thus far suggest that the law led to an increase of PT work among 
mothers with children under 7 working with a permanent contract, but not for those 
working with a fixed-term contract nor for fathers of small children.  Methodologically, 
we have relied on the differences-in-differences assumption that—in the absence of the 
law—the PT employment gap (net of linear and quadratic trends) between the treatment 
and control groups would have remained constant.  Because this assumption is not 
testable, we proceed to carry out placebo estimates, shown in Table 2.C.  This is to say 
that we estimate the same differences-in-differences models for a period in which no 
change in family-friendly laws took place.  We thus use a pre-reform period for such 
estimates, excluding post-1999 data.  None of the coefficients of interest in Table 2.C 
are statistically significant, supporting the assumption that our previous results on the 
effects of the family-friendly law were not spurious. 
Results on Employment and Type of Contract 
As explained in Section II, we expect the family-friendly law to increase employment in 
the primary segment of the labor market (that is, permanent contracts) for eligible 
mothers, because it protects them against any layoff.  Column 1 of Table 3.A presents 
the effects of the family-friendly policy on employment using the same specification as 
in equation (1) but having as the independent variable a dummy indicating whether the 
individual is working and with which type of contract.  Columns 2 and 3 show the 
effects of the law on permanent and fixed-term employment, respectively.  Panel A 
shows the estimates for mothers and Panel B shows the estimates for fathers.   As 
                                                 
13 Subgroup analysis finds that the effects are stronger among mothers with children under three, which is 
consistent with them needing more time to take care of their young children, especially given that public 
schooling for all begins when the child is 3 years old in Spain.   
 16 
 
expected, the policy increased by 3.7 percentage points (or 23%) the likelihood of 
working under a permanent contract for eligible mothers and decreased by 3.9 
percentage points (or 12%) their likelihood of working under a fixed-term contract.    It 
is interesting to note, however, that overall we observe no effect of the family-friendly 
law on employment (shown in Column 1), suggesting that it mainly affected the share 
of permanent contract workers among the eligible population.    As pointed before, in 
the Spanish labor market most PT jobs are concentrated in the secondary segment of the 
labor market.  This positive association if anything reinforces our result that the family-
friendly law increased the odds of working under a permanent contract for eligible 
mothers. To further investigate this issue, we estimated a multinomial logit with 6 
choices: out-of-the labor force, unemployment, PT fixed-term contract, full-time fixed-
term contract, PT permanent contract and full-time permanent contract (PT fixed-term 
permanent contract being the baseline category), and found that, for women, the family-
friendly policy led to a statistically significant relative increase in the odds of PT 
permanent contracts among eligible mothers relative to PT fixed-term contracts 
suggesting that the law led to a substitution between PT work in the secondary and the 
primary segments of the labor market.  Results for men are not statistically significant.  
These estimates are available from the authors upon request. 
  Results shown in Panel A of Table 3.A are robust to alternative specifications 
(shown in Table 3.B) and to the placebo tests (shown in Table 3.C).  Finally, Panel B of 
Table 3.A also shows that the law led to a relative decrease of fixed-term employment 
among fathers of young children of 3.9 percentage points.  Note, however, that this 
estimate is only statistically significant when the trend and its square is interacted with 
region dummies.  
Effects by Education Level 17 
 
The analysis thus far has analyzed the average effect of the law on the eligible 
population.  However, the average effect may hide important differences across groups.  
In what follows, we analyze the effect of the family friendly law by education level.  
The reason for this is that mothers’ decision on how much effort to devote to market 
activities may differ considerably across skill levels.  According to Becker’s 1985 and 
1991 models, mothers might optimally choose to decline work and effort outside the 
home after their first child is born (absent a change in marginal utility of income).  
However, because the marginal utility of income is likely to increase after birth due to 
the need for increased food, housing, diapers, child care, and the like, whether time or 
energy outside of home declines depends on the relative changes in marginal utility of 
income and in the marginal utility of time and energy spent in the home.  What this 
might imply for women with different skill levels is uncertain. For women with little 
income (such as high-school dropouts), the increased need for food and housing might 
dominate the pressures to spend time and energy on nurturing, so effort and time spent 
on market work might actually increase.  Higher skilled women might see less of a 
change in the utility of income and might be more inclined to cut back on time and 
energy devoted to market work.  On the other hand, higher skill women might also be 
in jobs where the impact of effort on wages is greater, so they might seek to reduce 
effort somewhat less.  
  If mothers’ response to how much effort to devote in market work differs across 
skill levels, it is likely that their responses to a family-friendly law, such as the one 
under analysis in this paper, are also likely to differ by education level.  Tables 4 and 5 
explore if indeed this is the case.   
Table 4 reports whether the law affected the PT rate among eligible mothers in 
either segment of the labor market by education level.  While no statistically significant 18 
 
effect is found for women working with a fixed-term contract, we observe that the 
surge in PT work after the family-friendly law is mainly driven by less skilled mothers 
working with a permanent contract.  Indeed, there is no statistically significant effect of 
the policy for college educated women.  For high-school dropouts and graduates, we 
find that the policy led to an increase in PT work among eligible mothers of 44 and 
15.1 percentage points, respectively.  Given that the rate of PT work among these 
groups was 24.13% and 16.99%, this implies that the law was very effective among 
these two groups.  These findings suggests that, in Spain, the opportunity costs of 
working PT for college educated mothers is very high, as the rate of PT work in the 
primary labor market for this group is only 11.13%.  Moreover, this percentage does 
not increase after the law.  In contrast, this is not the case for less skilled mothers, as the 
law led to important increases in their PT-work rates.    
Table 5 shows the effect of the policy on employment, and permanent and fixed-
term employment by education level.  In Columns 1 through 6, the only statistically 
significant effect of the law is on the odds of fixed-term employment for women with a 
high-school degree.  The law led to a decrease in fixed-term employment of 6.12 
percentage points (or 69.62%) for this group (while leaving the percentage for the other 
two groups unaffected).
14  These results suggests that the law prevented mothers with a 
high-school degree from moving to jobs in the secondary labor market—either because 
they lost their permanent contract job once they became mothers, or because, in order to 
reduce work-week hours, they had to switch to a fixed-term contract job.  However, in 
our preferred specification, the effect of the law on permanent employment of high-
school graduates is not statistically significant, suggesting that the decrease in 
                                                 
14 Only 8.65% of all eligible mothers without a high-school degree worked with a permanent contract.  
This percentage increases with education level to 16.41% for high-school graduates and to 36.20% for 
college graduates.  In contrast, the percentage of eligible mothers working with a fixed-term contract prior 
to the law is pretty constant across education level: 7.68% for high-school dropouts; 8.79% for high-
school graduates, and 7.69% for college graduates. 19 
 
secondary employment is not substituted by an increase in primary employment.
15  
Moreover, the lack of policy effect on overall employment for this group (shown in 
Column 1 of Table 5) suggests that the law did not induce women to remain employed 
(but with a reduced work schedule) instead of exiting employment, or to enter 
employment with a reduced work schedule.  Thus, it appears that the main policy effect 
on mothers with a high-school degree was to reduce their likelihood of employment in 
the secondary labor market. 
In contrast, no effect on permanent employment is found among high-school 
dropout women—despite the large increase in PT work.  Given that these women are 
more likely to be in a vulnerable position than those with a high-school degree (only 
8.65% of them worked with a permanent contract prior to the law compared with 
16.41% of those with a high-school degree), it is likely that the lack of effect in 
permanent employment is explained by them seeing a higher change in the utility of 
income after birth, and thus, being less inclined (in the absence of the law)  to quit their 
high-benefits permanent-contract job to reduce market-work hours to care for their child 
than mothers with a high-school degree.  Moreover, because these women must be a 
very selected group of high school dropouts (as less than 9% of them worked with a 
permanent contract prior to the law), employers did not laid them off when they became 
mothers (prior to the law).  Thus the main effect of the family-friendly policy is to 
induce them to switch to PT work but remain in the primary labor market. 
  
                                                 
15 When only a linear trend is included the coefficient on permanent employment for mothers with a high 
school degree becomes a 3.17 statistically significant percentage points increase. 20 
 
V.  Unintended Effects of the Law on Permanent Contract Work 
Thus far, we have seen that not all employees with access to this family-friendly law are 
able to use it as some may not consider necessary the use of PT work (men), and others 
(women in the secondary labor market) may fear negative reprisals (such as, the non-
renewal of their contract) if they request a work-week reduction.  In what follows, we 
explore whether this law led to unintended effects on individuals at risk-of-becoming 
eligible, in particular, on childbearing-aged women without children under seven.  The 
concern here is that employers may stop granting permanent contracts to the at-risk 
women, because they may be concerned that as soon as the woman gets a permanent 
contract she will decide to bear a child, request the reduced work schedule, and in this 
way she will gain full protection against any possible layoff until her youngest child 
reaches the age of seven.  If this concern exists, we ought to see that fixed-term contract 
work increases and permanent contract work decreases for the at-risk women relative to 
their male counterparts. 
 Identification Strategy 
In this Section we explore whether the family-friendly policy led to the unintended 
effect of reducing the odds of working in the primary labor market for the at-risk 
women (including both childless women and those with children older than seven) 
relative to childbearing-aged men (as eligible fathers did not access the new policy 
rights).  Notice that, in this Section, we exclude from the analysis eligible mothers (that 
is, those with children under seven).  Moreover, we also exclude from the analysis (as 
we did in the previous section) women who are not eligible at the time of the survey but 
may have been at some point in time to prevent contamination effects. 
Because the evidence in the previous Section indicated that the marginal utility of 
income and the marginal productivity of time and energy spent by mothers differs 21 
 
across skill levels, leading to different employment choices (before and after the law), 
we conduct the analysis by education level.  To analyze whether the law had such 
unintended effects we use a differences-in-differences approach (DD) similar to the one 
described earlier.  The difference is that now our treatment group are the at-risk 
women—defined as women between 23 and 45 years old without children under seven 
before and after the law—, whereas our control group are men of similar age to the 
treatment group.
16  
We focus on three outcomes of interest: employment, employment with a 
permanent and with a fixed-term contract, and estimate the following equation using 
only men and women from our treatment and control group: 
'
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where the variable WOMANi is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is a 
woman;  the variable AFTERit is a dummy equal 1 after the introduction of the policy (0 
otherwise);  the variable (WOMANi*AFTERit) is a dummy equal 1 if the individual is a 
women after the introduction of the policy, and can be interpreted as the policy variable.  
Again, we include interactions between the trend and its squared with the 17 region 
dummies.  Coefficient α3 gives us the estimated effect of the 1999 family-friendly policy 
on the at-risk women (relative to their male counterparts). 
However, because we are concerned that over this period major changes have 
occurred leading to important increases in female labor participation, we estimate an 
alternative specification in which, in addition to young men, we include women and 
men aged 46 to 64 years old.  In this way, older workers enable us to control for any 
differences across time and gender, not related to the law, obtaining the differences-in-
                                                 
16 Our results are robust to defining as childbearing women those between 18 and 45 years old.  However, 
to be consistent with the first part of the paper, and because Spanish women tend to delay birth to later 
years, we preferred showing the results using the age group 23 to 45 years.   
 22 
 
differences-in-differences (DDD) estimator.  This strategy is similar to the one used by 
Gruber, 1994; Ruhm, 1998; and Lai and Masters, 2005, among others.  For this purpose, 
we estimate equation (3):  
( ) 0 1 2 23_45 3 23_45 4
56 2 3 _ 4 5 7 2 3 _ 4 5
'
89 2 3 _ 4 5
*
( *) ( *) ( * *)
*( * )
it i i i i t
it it i it
it it it
Y WOMAN AGE AGE WOMAN AFTER
WOMAN AFTER AGE AFTER AGE WOMAN AFTER
tt A G E W O M A NX
αα α α α
ααα
αα β
=+ + + +
+++
++ +  (3)
 
  
where the variable WOMANi is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is a 
woman;  the variable AGE23-45i is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual’s 
age is within the childbearing age;  the variable (WOMANi * AGE23-45i) is an 
interaction of the two previous variables; the variable AFTERit is a dummy equal 1 after 
the introduction of the policy (0 otherwise);  the variable (WOMANi*AFTERit) is a 
dummy equal 1 if the individual is a women after the introduction of the policy;  the 
variable (AGE23-45i*AFTERit) is a is a dummy equal 1 if the individual’s age is within 
the childbearing age after the introduction of the policy;  the variable (WOMANi* 
AGE23-45i *AFTERit) is a dummy equal 1 if the individual is a childbearing-aged women 
years after the introduction of the policy.  Again, we include interactions between the 
trend and its squared with the 17 region dummies.  Coefficient α7 will now give us the 
estimated effect of the 1999 family-friendly policy on the at-risk women. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6 shows the average annual growth rate for several outcome variables for a 
period of six years before the policy implementation (1994-1999) and for a period of 
three years after the policy (2001-2003).  We distinguish between childbearing-aged 
women and men across three different education levels.  Below, we summarize the 
main findings from Table 6.   23 
 
Before the policy, men between 23 and 45 years had higher employment rates 
than childbearing-aged women.  As expected, this difference decreases with education.  
The gender gap in employment rates narrows over time as women experience larger 
increases in their employment rate.  This is also monotonic with education.  In terms of 
employment in the primary labor market, men are about twice more likely to have a 
permanent contract than women.  While the odds of working with a permanent contract 
increases for all groups over time, the raw data indicates that there is a differential 
growth pattern between high-school dropout women and men, and college graduate 
women and men, with women having a higher likelihood of working under a permanent 
contract after the law.  However, such differential pattern is not observed among high-
school graduates. 
Table 6 also shows that the share of PT work among childbearing-aged women 
decreases with education level, ranging from as much as 33% for high-school dropouts 
working in the secondary labor market to as little as 8% for college graduates working 
in the primary labor market.  For men, the share of PT work is practically non-existent 
in the primary labor market (and reaches 12% for college educated men in the 
secondary labor market).  Finally, worth highlighting is that there is a differential effect 
in the increase in PT work in the secondary labor market between women and men 
without a college degree.  Again, because of systematic socio-demographic differences 
across the different groups (also shown in Table 6), we proceed with the multivariate 
analysis. 
Results 
Table 7.A reports the estimated coefficients from Equation (2) for three separate sub-
populations: high-school dropouts, high-school graduates and college graduates.  The 
coefficients of interest are reported in the third row.  It measures the effect of the policy 24 
 
on employment for childbearing-aged women relative to childbearing-aged men (net of 
any differential trends between the treatment and the comparison group).  The 
specification shown includes the same controls as in equation (1).  
Table 7.A shows that the law led to an increase of 2.49 percentage points in 
employment among high-school graduate childbearing-aged women relative to similar-
aged men and that this increase is driven by employment in the secondary labor market.  
Estimates in Table 7.A reveal that fixed-term contract among high-school childbearing 
women increased by 4.09 percentage points relative to similar men.  Both of these 
coefficients are statistically significant, robust to alternative specifications (shown in 
Table 7.B) and to the placebo test (shown in Table 7.C).     
Because of concerns that important employment changes across genders and 
time may be affecting our results, we proceed to estimate equation 3, in which, older 
workers enable us to control for any gender differences across time, not related to the 
law.  Table 8.A shows the DDD specification, in which, we control for any gender 
differences that may arise over time by including in the specification men and women 
older than 45 years old.  According to results from Table 8.A, we observe that the law 
had a statistically significant effect on permanent employment for high-school graduate 
at-risk women.  It decreased permanent employment by 4.31 percentage points among 
the at-risk women relative to the observed changes in the comparison group (net of any 
underlying trends).  Given that 24% of the at-risk women were employed with a 
permanent contract prior to the law, this implies that the policy decreased the relative 
odds of working in the primary labor market by 17.96% for this group.  Interestingly, 
the law led to sizeable and statistically significant increases in permanent employment 
for childbearing-aged men (a 4.07 percentage points increase) and for older women (a 
2.12 percentage points increase), which implies increases of 9.01% and 13.98%, 25 
 
respectively.
17  Similar estimates with fixed-term contract employment as a LHS 
variable show that the policy led to a relative increase in the odds of working with a 
fixed-term contract of 4.83 percentage points (or 29.66%) among the at-risk women—
among childbearing-aged men, the law led to a relative decrease of 2.46 percentage 
points (or 8.87%).  These results are robust to alternative specifications (shown in Table 
8.B) and placebo test (shown in Table 8.C). 
These results highlight that the family-friendly law led employers to drastically 
reduce their hiring of the at-risk women with a high school degree for jobs in the 
primary labor market.  Given that the law did not lead to differential changes in the 
overall employment rate for the at-risk women relative to the comparison group (shown 
in Column 2 of Table 8.A), we suspect that employers basically substituted permanent-
contract hiring by fixed-term-contract hiring among this group, and hired childbearing-
aged men or older women in permanent contracts instead.  Policy wise this is 
particularly concerning as the at-risk women with a high-school degree in Spain 
represent as much as 55% of all the at-risk women and 54% of all women between 23 
and 45 years old.
18 
  Not surprisingly, we find no effect on the at-risk women with a college degree.  
This is most likely due to the fact that eligible mothers with a college did not access the 
family-friendly law, implying that in essence the family-friendly law was not binding 
for this group.   
 
VI.  Conclusion 
Suppose that a government in a country with a segmented labor market adopts a 
generous family-friendly policy that offers all parents of young children (up to a certain 
                                                 
17 Prior to the law, 45.14% of childbearing-aged men and 15.02% of women older than 45 years were 
employed with a permanent. 
18 Among this population, high-school dropouts represents 26%, and college graduates 18%.  26 
 
age) the right for reduced and flexible work arrangements, and that this law also 
protects eligible parents against dismissal if they use the rights offered by the new 
policy.  If for social and cultural reasons, mainly women request such right, employers 
will soon realize that offering childbearing-aged women (regardless of whether they 
have children or not) a permanent contract shields them from a layoff once they become 
mothers and request the reduced work schedule (until the youngest child reaches the 
threshold age established by the policy).  While the policy also protects mothers 
working under a fixed-term contract, employers who do not want to offer reduced work 
hours to workers with fixed-term contracts only have to wait for their contract to expire 
to terminate the employment relationship.  Thus, an unintended consequence of this 
policy is that employers will prefer hiring men under permanent contract, and mainly 
offer childbearing-aged women fixed-term contracts.
19  In this paper we analyze 
whether such unintended effects occurred in Spain after the Government introduced a 
law in 1999 that declared a layoff invalid if the worker had previously asked for a work-
week reduction due to family responsibilities. 
Using cross-sectional data from the 1994 to 2003 Spanish Labor Force Survey 
(LFS) and a differences-in-differences approach, we find that the law was only 
effective among eligible mothers—that is, those with children under seven—, working 
in the primary labor market.  However, the law had no effect on eligible fathers or 
eligible mothers working with a fixed-term contract, corroborating our intuition that, 
due to economic, social and cultural reasons, mainly mothers in the primary labor 
market access (or are able to use) the policy.  Heterogeneity analysis reveals that this 
effect is driven by less-educated women.     
                                                 
19 Although the law also shields fathers of young children, if they do not use such program, employers 
will not discriminate against them offering them jobs in the secondary labor market. 27 
 
We then use a DD approach to explore whether the law had any unintended 
effects among non-eligible childbearing-aged women.  Indeed, we find that among 
those with a high-school degree, the law significantly increased their likelihood of 
having a fixed-term contract job (relative to same age men).  When a DDD approach is 
used to control for gender differences across time, we find evidence that, after the law, 
employers prefer hiring childbearing-aged men and older women under permanent 
contracts (compared to non-eligible childbearing-aged women because they may 
become eligible).  We argue that this finding is particularly concerning as it affects the 
majority of women between 23 and 45 years in Spain.  Our paper provides direct 
evidence of the mediating effect of institutions in general, and of a dual system of job 
protection in particular, for the effectiveness of family-friendly policies. Overall, it 
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Note.- The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.  † mean significantly different from  
comparison’s mean at the 90% confidence level.  
¥Or with children 7 to 16 years old for men. 
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Sample size  40,345 30,208  26,764  26,930  
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Table 2.A  Part-Time Employment Effect of the Family-Friendly Law on the Eligible Population 
Treatment: Parents with Small Children.  Control: Parents with Older Children 
LFS 1994-2003 
 
  Working with a Permanent contract Working with a fixed-term contract
 Women  Men  Women  Men 
Child <7  -0.0429*  0.000149  0.0528  0.00931 
  (0.0247) (0.00315) (0.0441)  (0.0118) 
Post 1999  -0.0923***  -0.00362  0.103*  0.00239 
  (0.0353) (0.00506) (0.0605)  (0.0171) 
Post 1999   0.152***  0.000345  -0.0928  -0.00797 
*  child<  7  (0.0423) (0.00569) (0.0775)  (0.0200) 
Trend  -0.0124 -0.0228 -0.0137  0.00582 
 (0.0838)  (0.0219)  (0.114)  (0.0277) 
Trend* child<7  0.00492  0.00143  -0.00369  -0.000296 
 (0.00752)  (0.00166)  (0.0102)  (0.00252) 
Trend square  0.0291**  1.14e-05  -0.0382*  -0.00705 
  (0.0119) (0.00143) (0.0215)  (0.00535) 
Trend square*   -0.00457***  -5.21e-05  0.00476*  0.000760 
child<7 (0.00142)  (0.000157)  (0.00258)  (0.000627) 
Observations 16,077 42,963  8,698  19,802 
Post 1999 + Post 
1999 * child<7 
0.0593**   
(0.0239) 
-0.0032 
  (0.0028)   
0.0103 
  (0.0496) 
-0.0055 
   (0.0109) 
Note:  Additional controls include age and age square, cohabitation and marital status, a dummy indicating 
whether the individual is the household head, a variable indicating the number of children in the household, 
education dummies, an immigration dummy, a dummy indicating whether the individual was working the 
previous year, provinces’ unemployment rate, 17 region dummies, and these 17 dummies interacted by the 
time trend and its squared.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 2.B.  Sensitivity Tests.  Part-Time Employment Effect of the Family-Friendly Law, 
Treatment: Parents with Small Children.  Control: Parents with Older Children 
LFS 1994-2003 
 
  Working with a Permanent contract Working with a fixed-term contract
 Women  Men  Women  Men 
1.  Raw  0.0166 -0.00381* 0.0240  0.00217 
  (0.0159) (0.00220) (0.0290) (0.00738) 
2. Controls but no 
trend 
0.0166 -0.00295 0.0166 0.00318 
  (0.0155) (0.00210) (0.0286) (0.00723) 
3. Plus linear trend  0.0688**  -0.000511  0.00325  0.00861 
  (0.0287) (0.00464) (0.0511)  (0.0134) 
4. Plus trend regional  0.0667**  -0.000502  0.00425  0.00884 
Interactions  (0.0287) (0.00464) (0.0511)  (0.0135) 
5. Controls + squared   0.154***  0.000306  -0.101  -0.00767 
Trend  (0.0422) (0.00569) (0.0786)  (0.0199) 
6. Plus trend regional   0.152***  0.000345  -0.0928  -0.00797 
Interactions  (0.0423) (0.00569) (0.0775)  (0.0200) 
Observations 16,077  42,963  8,698  19,802 
Note:  Except for row 1, controls include age and age square, cohabitation and marital status, a dummy 
indicating whether the individual is the household head, a variable indicating the number of children in 
the household, education dummies, an immigration dummy, a dummy indicating whether the individual 
was working the previous year, provinces’ unemployment rate, and 17 region dummies.  In addition, in 
rows 4 and 6, these 17 dummies are interacted by the time trend (row 4) and the trend and its squared 
(row 6).  
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Table 2.C  Placebo Tests. Part-Time Employment Effect of the Family-Friendly Law, 
Treatment: Parents with Small Children.  Control: Parents with Older Children 
LFS 1994-1999 
 
  Working with a Permanent contract Working with a fixed-term contract
  Women Men Women Men 
Child <7  -0.0815**  -0.00629  0.0872  0.0450** 
 (0.0358)  (0.00497)  (0.0668)  (0.0175) 
Post 1997  0.0280  -0.00270  -0.0178  0.00281 
 (0.0267)  (0.00302)  (0.0468)  (0.0116) 
Post 1997   -0.0177  0.00303  0.0156  0.0134 
* child< 7  (0.0353)  (0.00479)  (0.0617)  (0.0139) 
Trend 0.0825  -0.0383  -0.209  0.0369 
  (0.210) (0.0485) (0.291) (0.0662) 
Trend* child<7  -0.0103  0.00338  0.0287  -0.00542 
 (0.0301)  (0.00610)  (0.0444)  (0.00831) 
Trend square  0.0521**  0.00544  -0.0558  -0.0320*** 
 (0.0238)  (0.00340)  (0.0440)  (0.0108) 
Trend square*   -0.00724**  -0.000966*  0.00666  0.00388*** 
child<7 (0.00323)  (0.000499)  (0.00567)  (0.00142) 
Observations 10,370 29,749  5,939  14,505 
Note:  Same controls as in Table 2.A. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 3.A Employment Effect of the Family-Friendly Law,  
Treatment: Parents with Small Children.  Control: Parents with Older Children 
LFS 1994-2003 
 
  Panel A: Women  Panel B: Men 








Child <7  -0.0138  0.0248***  -0.0387***  0.0253**  -0.0428***  0.0682*** 
 (0.00891)  (0.00843)  (0.00848)  (0.0104)  (0.0126) (0.0125) 
Post 1999  -0.00379  -0.0221  0.0183  -0.0131  -0.0284*  0.0153 
 (0.0139)  (0.0136)  (0.0146)  (0.0120)  (0.0157) (0.0163) 
Post  1999 -0.00175 0.0368** -0.0385** -0.0179  0.0213  -0.0392* 
* child< 7  (0.0176)  (0.0168)  (0.0173)  (0.0150)  (0.0212)  (0.0215) 
Trend 0.00917  0.00586  0.00330  0.00706 0.00106  0.00600 
 (0.0130)  (0.0113)  (0.0109)  (0.0259)  (0.0270) (0.0304) 
Trend* child<7  -0.000842  -0.000134  -0.000708  -0.00127  -0.000140  -0.00113 
 (0.00125)  (0.00108)  (0.00106)  (0.00227)  (0.00241)  (0.00266) 
Trend square  -0.000282  -0.00201  0.00173  -0.00535  0.0191***  -0.0244*** 
 (0.00464)  (0.00445)  (0.00454)  (0.00459)  (0.00591)  (0.00595) 
Trend square*  -0.000186  -0.000237  5.14e-05  0.000558  -0.00166**  0.00222*** 
child<7 (0.000584)  (0.000564)  (0.000583)  (0.000515)  (0.000700)  (0.000709) 
Observations 91,238  91,238  91,238  78,551  78,551  78,551 
Post 1999 +  -0.0055 0.0146  -0.0201  -0.03103***  -0.00710  -0.0239* 
Post 1999 * 
child<7 
(0.0110) (0.0100)  (0.0095)  0.0095  0.0457  0.0144 
Note:  Additional controls include age and age square, cohabitation and marital status, a dummy indicating whether the individual 
is the household head, a variable indicating the number of children in the household, education dummies, an immigration dummy, 
a dummy indicating whether the individual was working the previous year, provinces’ unemployment rate, 17 region dummies, 
and these 17 dummies interacted by the time trend and its squared. 




Table 3.B.  Sensitivity Tests.  Employment Effects of the Family-Friendly Law, 
 Treatment: Parents with Small Children.  Control: Parents with Older Children 
LFS 1994-2003 
 
  Panel A: Women  Panel B: Men 








1. Raw  0.00207  0.0246***  -0.0226***  0.00468  0.0438***  -0.0391*** 
 (0.00970)  (0.00870)  (0.00694)  (0.00707)  (0.00969)  (0.00845) 
2. Controls but no 
trend 
-0.00607 0.0314*** -0.0375*** -0.00590  -0.0151  0.00923 
 (0.0109)  (0.0103)  (0.0105)  (0.0109)  (0.0143)  (0.0144) 
3. Plus linear trend  -0.00607  0.0314***  -0.0375***  -0.00590  -0.0151  0.00923 
 (0.0109)  (0.0103)  (0.0105)  (0.0109)  (0.0143)  (0.0144) 
4. Plus trend 
regional 
-0.00607 0.0314*** -0.0375*** -0.00590  -0.0151  0.00923 
Interactions (0.0109)  (0.0103)  (0.0105)  (0.0109)  (0.0143) (0.0144) 
5. Controls + 
squared trend 
-0.00629 0.0418*** -0.0481*** -0.00765  -0.00642  -0.00122 
 (0.0137)  (0.0128)  (0.0127)  (0.0125)  (0.0177)  (0.0177) 
6. Plus trend 
regional  
-0.00175 0.0368** -0.0385**  -0.0179  0.0213  -0.0392* 
Interactions (0.0176)  (0.0168)  (0.0173)  (0.0150)  (0.0212) (0.0215) 
Observations 91238  91238  91238  78551 78551  78551 
Note:  Except for row 1, controls include age and age square, cohabitation and marital status, a dummy indicating whether the 
individual is the household head, a variable indicating the number of children in the household, education dummies, an 
immigration dummy, a dummy indicating whether the individual was working the previous year, provinces’ unemployment rate, 
and 17 region dummies.  In addition, in rows 4 and 6, these 17 dummies are interacted by the time trend (row 4) and the trend and 
its squared (row 6). 
 
 
Table 3.C Placebo Test.  Employment Effects of the Family-Friendly Law,  
Treatment: Parents with Small Children.  Control: Parents with Older Children 
LFS 1994-1999 
 
  Panel A: Women  Panel B: Men 








Child <7  -0.00783  0.0236**  -0.0314***  0.0214  -0.0277  0.0491*** 
 (0.0127)  (0.0119)  (0.0118)  (0.0164)  (0.0189) (0.0185) 
Post 1997  -0.000218  -0.00172  0.00151  -0.00954  -0.0109  0.00138 
 (0.00934)  (0.00878)  (0.00923)  (0.0103)  (0.0118) (0.0120) 
Post 1997  0.0230*  0.00784  0.0152  0.00437  3.21e-05  0.00434 
* child< 7  (0.0120)  (0.0111)  (0.0116)  (0.0141)  (0.0167)  (0.0167) 
Trend 0.0476*  0.0241 0.0236  -0.0782  0.0490  -0.127* 
 (0.0281)  (0.0249)  (0.0253)  (0.0600)  (0.0590) (0.0660) 
Trend* child<7  -0.00714*  -0.00310  -0.00404  0.0131  -0.00691  0.0200** 
 (0.00384)  (0.00351)  (0.00356) (0.00829) (0.00818)  (0.00908)
Trend square  -0.00270  -0.00106  -0.00164  -0.00355  0.0106  -0.0141 
 (0.00846)  (0.00784)  (0.00791)  (0.0105)  (0.0122) (0.0120) 
Trend square*  -0.000682  -0.000693  1.03e-05  0.000137  -0.000466  0.000603 
child<7 (0.00114)  (0.00105)  (0.00107)  (0.00132) (0.00159)  (0.00158) 
Observations 67109  67109  67109  57138  57138  57138 
Note:  Same controls as in Table 3.A. 





Table 4.  Part-Time Employment Effects, By Education Level 
Treatment: Parents with Small Children.  Control: Parents with Older Children 
LFS 1994-2003 
 
VARIABLES  Working with a Permanent contract  Working with a fixed-term contract 
  HS dropout  HS graduate  College  HS dropout  HS graduate  College 
Child <7  -0.166***  -0.0444  0.0434  0.00897  0.119**  -0.112 
  (0.0573)  (0.0315)  (0.0526) (0.0723) (0.0591)  (0.230) 
Post 1999  -0.205**  -0.106**  0.118  0.147  0.0493  0.462* 
 (0.0831)  (0.0425)  (0.0760)  (0.103)  (0.0778)  (0.261) 
Post 1999   0.440***  0.151***  -0.0947  -0.00630  -0.106  -0.414 
*  child<  7  (0.131) (0.0513)  (0.0861)  (0.140)  (0.0967) (0.302) 
Trend -0.238  0.100  -0.758**  0.227  0.0689  -0.411*** 
  (0.169) (0.0846) (0.350) (0.168) (0.174)  (0.129) 
Trend* child<7  0.0309  -0.00339  0.0529*  -0.0272*  -0.0106  0.0279** 
  (0.0188) (0.00791) (0.0302) (0.0146) (0.0152)  (0.0128) 
Trend square  0.102***  0.0299**  -0.0219  -0.00943  -0.0705**  -0.00650 
  (0.0318)  (0.0150)  (0.0230) (0.0364) (0.0281)  (0.0966) 
Trend square*   -0.0144***  -0.00478***  0.00368  0.00111  0.00785**  0.00543 
child<7  (0.00409)  (0.00177)  (0.00266) (0.00441) (0.00333)  (0.0104) 
Observations 3151  10140  2786  2683  5293  722 
Post 1999 +   .2356413**   
.0997364    
.0446622   
.0297586   
.0229352   
.0425192 
.1410784    
.096701 
-.0569321   
.0591036 
   .0478262   
.1505344 
Post 1999 * child<7           
Note:  Additional controls include age and age square, cohabitation and marital status, a dummy indicating whether the 
individual is the household head, a variable indicating the number of children in the household, an immigration dummy, a 
dummy indicating whether the individual was working the previous year, provinces’ unemployment rate, 17 region dummies, 
and these 17 dummies interacted by the time trend and its squared. 




Table 5. Employment Effects of the Family Friendly Law on Eligible Women, By Education Level 
Treatment: Parents with Small Children.  Control: Parents with Older Children 
LFS 1994-2003 
 
  Employment Permanent  employment  Fixed-term  employment 
  HS dropout  HS graduate  College  HS dropout  HS graduate College  HS dropout  HS graduate  College
Child <7  -0.0273**  -0.00871  0.000240  0.0114  0.0344***  0.0294  -0.0388***  -0.0431***  -0.0292 
 (0.0129) (0.0133)  (0.0373) (0.0114) (0.0124) (0.0406) (0.0123) (0.0127) (0.0325)
Post 1999  -0.0214  0.0123  -0.0217  -0.0204  -0.0216  -0.0181  -0.00101  0.0339*  -0.00358 
 (0.0229)  (0.0192)  (0.0433)  (0.0221)  (0.0178)  (0.0534)  (0.0244)  (0.0191)  (0.0533) 
Post 1999   0.0495  -0.0335  0.0430  0.0379  0.0285  0.0462  0.0116  -0.0621***  -0.00321 
* child< 7  (0.0318)  (0.0231)  (0.0532)  (0.0279)  (0.0214)  (0.0625)  (0.0315)  (0.0222)  (0.0595) 
Trend -0.0116  0.0341*  -0.0771  -0.0117  0.0237  -0.00276  4.97e-05  0.0105  -0.0743 
 (0.0133)  (0.0207)  (0.101)  (0.0127)  (0.0187)  (0.0502)  (0.0114)  (0.0162)  (0.0913) 
Trend* 
child<7 
0.000739 -0.00271  0.00577  0.00124  -0.00152  -0.000309  -0.000501  -0.00119  0.00608 
 (0.00137)  (0.00193)  (0.00926)  (0.00123)  (0.00175)  (0.00502)  (0.00117)  (0.00154)  (0.00827) 
Trend square  0.00924  -0.00519  -0.00216  0.000552  -0.00598  -0.000566  0.00869  0.000792  -0.00159 
 (0.00754)  (0.00646)  (0.0169)  (0.00663)  (0.00611)  (0.0188)  (0.00736)  (0.00626)  (0.0164) 
Trend 
square*  
-0.00173* 0.000628  -0.000615  -0.000716  0.000262  -0.000615  -0.00101  0.000366  2.29e-07 
child<7 (0.00101)  (0.000783)  (0.00192)  (0.000889)  (0.000744)  (0.00220) (0.000999) (0.000768)  (0.00206) 
Observations 29701  53545  7992  29701  53545  7992  29701  53545  7992 





Descriptive Statistics of Non-Eligible Childbearing Aged Women Prior to the Law, 1994-1999 LFS 
Note.- The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.  † mean significantly different from comparison’s mean at the 90% 
confidence level.  
  High-school dropouts  High-school graduates  College graduates 




























































































































           








































































































































Sample size  31,892  36,354 53,391  71,964 15,719  14,678  
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Table 7.A Differences in Differences Employment Effects, By Education Level 
Treatment: Childbearing-Aged Women without Children Under Seven,  Control: Childbearing-Aged Men 
LFS 1994-2003 
 
   Permanent  contract 
VARIABLES  Employment  Permanent employment  Fixed-term employment  
  HS dropout  HS graduate College  HS dropout  HS graduate  College  HS dropout  HS graduate  College 
Woman  -0.0869***  -0.0748***  -0.0657***  -0.0418***  -0.0266***  -0.0360** -0.0451*** -0.0482***  -0.0297* 
 (0.00944)  (0.00781)  (0.0154)  (0.00962)  (0.00804)  (0.0150)  (0.0104)  (0.00852)  (0.0161) 
Post 1999  -0.0137  -0.0300***  -0.00877  -0.0127  -0.00497  0.0313**  -0.00105  -0.0250***  -0.0400** 
 (0.0118)  (0.00674)  (0.0144)  (0.0142)  (0.00876)  (0.0158)  (0.0156)  (0.00911)  (0.0168) 
Post 1999*  -0.0178  0.0249**  0.0210  -0.00807  -0.0160  0.0143  -0.00977  0.0409***  0.00671 
Woman (0.0168)  (0.0110)  (0.0215)  (0.0186)  (0.0125)  (0.0225)  (0.0201)  (0.0131)  (0.0242) 
Trend -0.00399  0.00958  -0.0562  -0.00311  0.0149  -0.0304  -0.000878  -0.00530  -0.0258 
 (0.0201)  (0.0152)  (0.0377)  (0.0188)  (0.0152)  (0.0331)  (0.0215)  (0.0171)  (0.0411) 
Trend square    -0.000145  -0.00127  0.00485  -0.000390  -0.00148  0.00293  0.000245  0.000212  0.00192 
 (0.00181)  (0.00131)  (0.00314)  (0.00170)  (0.00133)  (0.00287)  (0.00196)  (0.00148)  (0.00340) 
Trend* -0.00971**  -0.00745** 0.00908 0.0107** -0.00149 -0.00678 -0.0204*** -0.00595 0.0159** 
Woman  (0.00447) (0.00332)  (0.00657)  (0.00479)  (0.00360)  (0.00668)  (0.00518)  (0.00376)  (0.00711) 
Trend squared*   0.00115**  0.000577  -0.000618  -0.000562  0.000170  0.000555  0.00171***  0.000406  -0.00117 
*women (0.000540)  (0.000362)  (0.000708)  (0.000596)  (0.000408)  (0.000745)  (0.000647)  (0.000425)  (0.000784) 
Observations 91,260  192,010  50,215  91,260  192,010  50,215  91,260  192,010 50,215 
Note:  Additional controls include age and age square, cohabitation and marital status, a dummy indicating whether the individual is the household head, a variable 
indicating the number of children in the household, an immigration dummy, a dummy indicating whether the individual was working the previous year, provinces’ 
unemployment rate, 17 region dummies, and these 17 dummies interacted by the time trend and its squared. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7.B Sensitivity Tests.  Differences in Differences Employment Effects, By Education Level 
Treatment: Childbearing-Aged Women without Children Under Seven,  Control: Childbearing-Aged Men 
LFS 1994-2003 
 
   Permanent  contract 
VARIABLES  Employment  Permanent employment  Fixed-term employment  
  HS dropout  HS graduate College  HS dropout  HS graduate  College  HS dropout  HS graduate  College 
1. Raw  0.0204**  0.0284***  0.0404***  0.0305***  -0.00632  0.0295***  -0.0101  0.0347***  0.0109 
 (0.00861)  (0.00533)  (0.0105)  (0.00846)  (0.00568)  (0.0112)  (0.00769)  (0.00494)  (0.00909) 
2. Controls but no 
trend 
0.00577 0.0230*** 0.0303***  0.0175** -0.0134***  0.0142*  -0.0118  0.0364***  0.0161* 
 (0.00613)  (0.00407)  (0.00809)  (0.00684)  (0.00457)  (0.00834)  (0.00735)  (0.00478)  (0.00886) 
3. Plus linear trend  0.00965  0.0370***  0.0124  -0.0216*  -0.0127  0.0263  0.0313**  0.0497***  -0.0139 
 (0.0111)  (0.00809)  (0.0163)  (0.0119)  (0.00880)  (0.0163)  (0.0128)  (0.00925)  (0.0177) 
4. Plus trend 
regional 
0.00920 0.0369***  0.0124  -0.0206*  -0.0126  0.0260  0.0298**  0.0495***  -0.0137 
Interactions (0.0111)  (0.00809)  (0.0163)  (0.0118)  (0.00880)  (0.0162)  (0.0127)  (0.00924)  (0.0177) 
5. Controls + 
squared trend 
-0.0179 0.0248**  0.0209  -0.00684  -0.0160  0.0140  0.00601  0.0412***  0.00103 
 (0.0168)  (0.0110)  (0.0216)  (0.0187)  (0.0125)  (0.0225)  (0.0188)  (0.0127)  (0.0236) 
6. Plus trend 
regional  
-0.0178 0.0249**  0.0210  -0.00807  -0.0160  0.0143  -0.00977  0.0409***  0.00671 
Interactions (0.0168)  (0.0110)  (0.0215)  (0.0186)  (0.0125)  (0.0225)  (0.0201) (0.0131)  (0.0242) 
Observations 91,260  192,010  50,215  91,260  192,010  50,215  91,260  192,010 50,215 
Note:  Except for row 1, controls include age and age square, cohabitation and marital status, a dummy indicating whether the individual is the household head, a variable 
indicating the number of children in the household, an immigration dummy, a dummy indicating whether the individual was working the previous year, provinces’ unemployment 
rate, and 17 region dummies.  In addition, in rows 4 and 6, these 17 dummies are interacted by the time trend (row 4) and the trend and its squared (row 6). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7.C Placebo Test: Differences in Differences Employment Effects, By Education Level 
Treatment: Childbearing-Aged Women without Children Under Seven,  Control: Childbearing-Aged Men 
LFS 1994-1999 
 
   Permanent  contract 
VARIABLES  Employment  Permanent employment  Fixed-term employment  
  HS dropout  HS graduate College  HS dropout  HS graduate  College  HS dropout  HS graduate  College 
Woman -0.110***  -0.0731***  -0.0944***  -0.0444***  -0.0515***  -0.0187  -0.0651***  -0.0216  -0.0757*** 
 (0.0139)  (0.0125)  (0.0246)  (0.0138)  (0.0126)  (0.0239)  (0.0148)  (0.0132)  (0.0255) 
Post 1997  0.00936  -0.00626  0.0193  -0.00572  0.00153  -0.00719  0.0151  -0.00779  0.0265* 
 (0.00994)  (0.00683)  (0.0141)  (0.0103)  (0.00754)  (0.0144)  (0.0113)  (0.00787)  (0.0148) 
Post 1997*  0.00266  -0.00738  -0.0297  0.0148  -0.00222  0.00481  -0.0121  -0.00516  -0.0345 
Woman (0.0129)  (0.0102)  (0.0208)  (0.0128)  (0.0106)  (0.0202)  (0.0141)  (0.0111)  (0.0219) 
Trend -0.103**  -0.0111  -0.0202  -0.00415  0.00117  0.00957  -0.0991**  -0.0122  -0.0297 
 (0.0434)  (0.0355)  (0.0959)  (0.0380)  (0.0349)  (0.0790)  (0.0423)  (0.0394)  (0.0975) 
Trend square    0.0158***  0.00243  0.000154  0.000711  0.000535  -0.00133  0.0151**  0.00189  0.00149 
 (0.00612)  (0.00503)  (0.0131)  (0.00524)  (0.00480)  (0.0105)  (0.00599)  (0.00544)  (0.0128) 
Trend* 0.0112  -0.00363 0.0392** 0.0190** 0.0171** -0.0146 -0.00776 -0.0208** 0.0538*** 
Woman  (0.00898) (0.00784)  (0.0158)  (0.00898)  (0.00796)  (0.0153)  (0.00970)  (0.00837)  (0.0164) 
Trend squared*   -0.00214*  0.000275  -0.00391**  -0.00236*  -0.00247**  0.00149  0.000222  0.00275***  -0.00539** 
*women (0.00121)  (0.000977)  (0.00199)  (0.00123)  (0.00101)  (0.00193)  (0.00132)  (0.00106)  (0.00210) 
Observations 68246  125355  30397  68246  125355  30397  68246  125355 30397 
Note:  Same controls as in Table 7.A. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8.A Differences in Differences in Differences Estimates 
Employment Effects of the Family Friendly Law on Non-Eligible Childbearing-Aged Women, 
By Education Level, LFS 1994-2003 
 
VARIABLES  Employment  Permanent employment  Fixed-term employment  
  HS dropout  HS graduate College  HS dropout  HS graduate  College  HS dropout  HS graduate  College 
Woman  -0.0396*** -0.107***  -0.0671***  -0.0267*** -0.106***  -0.0810***  -0.0129***  -0.00124  0.0140* 
  (0.00236) (0.00419)  (0.00915)  (0.00250) (0.00466) (0.00951)  (0.00239)  (0.00376)  (0.00782) 
age_23_45  0.0165*** -0.0493*** -0.0741***  -0.0226*** -0.0805***  -0.0749***  0.0391***  0.0312***  0.000870 
  (0.00381) (0.00437)  (0.00830)  (0.00423) (0.00518) (0.00927)  (0.00429)  (0.00439)  (0.00745) 
age_23_45*  -0.0608*** 0.0248*** -0.0119  0.0144**  0.0811***  0.0327**  -0.0752***  -0.0564***  -0.0446*** 
Woman  (0.00691) (0.00801)  (0.0162)  (0.00681) (0.00835) (0.0162)  (0.00714)  (0.00823)  (0.0158) 
Post 1999  -0.00415 -0.0407*** -0.0238*  0.00199  -0.0398***  0.000621  -0.00613  -0.000924  -0.0244* 
  (0.00477) (0.00675)  (0.0131)  (0.00568) (0.00815) (0.0150)  (0.00541)  (0.00752)  (0.0132) 
Post 1999*  -0.0105*** 0.0152*** -0.0130  -0.00856** 0.0212***  0.00936  -0.00196  -0.00600  -0.0223** 
Woman  (0.00321) (0.00583)  (0.0126)  (0.00373) (0.00657) (0.0138)  (0.00325)  (0.00511)  (0.0104) 
age_23_45*  -0.00513 0.0161*** 0.0261*** -0.0261***  0.0407***  0.0301***  0.0210***  -0.0246***  -0.00396 
Post 1999  (0.00513) (0.00517)  (0.00946)  (0.00618) (0.00613) (0.0107)  (0.00630)  (0.00525) (0.00836) 
age_23_45*  -0.00764 0.00528  0.0273  0.0121 -0.0431***  0.00659  -0.0197  0.0483***  0.0207 
Post 1999*woman  (0.0137) (0.0119)  (0.0239)  (0.0143) (0.0131) (0.0247)  (0.0150)  (0.0128)  (0.0241) 
Trend  0.00878 0.00321  -0.0517  0.0110  0.00875  -0.0307  -0.00217  -0.00553  -0.0210 
  (0.0110) (0.0129)  (0.0365)  (0.0102) (0.0132) (0.0335)  (0.0107)  (0.0141)  (0.0328) 
Trend square    -0.00102 -0.000731  0.00461  -0.00126  -0.000999  0.00296  0.000234  0.000268  0.00165 
  (0.000971) (0.00110)  (0.00296)  (0.000903)  (0.00114) (0.00277)  (0.000951)  (0.00120) (0.00268) 
Trend*age_23_45*  0.000674 -0.00271  0.0138** 0.00783** 0.000436  -0.000913  -0.00716**  -0.00315  0.0147** 
woman  (0.00329) (0.00307)  (0.00600)  (0.00329)  (0.00324) (0.00603)  (0.00350)  (0.00336) (0.00629) 
Trend squared*   0.000318 0.000259 -0.000894 -0.000464 0.000103  6.26e-05  0.000782*  0.000156  -0.000956 
age_23_45*women  (0.000408) (0.000335) (0.000651)  (0.000418)  (0.000364)  (0.000672)  (0.000447)  (0.000377)  (0.000696
) 
Observations 280,034  241,592  61,911  280,034  241,592  61,911  280,034  241,592 61,911 
Note:  Additional controls include age and age square, cohabitation and marital status, a dummy indicating whether the individual is the household head, a variable 
indicating the number of children in the household, an immigration dummy, a dummy indicating whether the individual was working the previous year, provinces’ 
unemployment rate, 17 region dummies, and these 17 dummies interacted by the time trend and its squared. 






Table 8.B Sensitivity Analysis.  Differences in Differences in Differences Estimates 
Employment Effects of the Family Friendly Law on Non-Eligible Childbearing-Aged Women, 
By Education Level, LFS 1994-2003 
 
VARIABLES  Employment  Permanent employment  Fixed-term employment  
  HS dropout  HS graduate College  HS dropout  HS graduate  College  HS dropout  HS graduate  College 
1. Raw  0.0666***  -0.0110  0.0314  0.0668***  -0.0502***  0.00674  -0.000152  0.0392***  0.0246* 
 (0.0103)  (0.0113) (0.0253) (0.0100) (0.0114) (0.0255) (0.00840) (0.00716) (0.0137) 
2. Controls but no 
trend 
0.0176**  0.00797  0.0433***  0.0263***  -0.0351*** 0.00524  -0.00862  0.0431*** 0.0381*** 
 (0.00694)  (0.00711)  (0.0151)  (0.00782)  (0.00800)  (0.0161)  (0.00805)  (0.00699)  (0.0136) 
3. Plus linear trend  -0.000358  0.0101  0.0139  0.00349  -0.0409***  0.0103  -0.00385  0.0510***  0.00356 
 (0.00961)  (0.00965)  (0.0199)  (0.0101)  (0.0105)  (0.0205)  (0.0104)  (0.00989)  (0.0192) 
4. Plus trend 
regional 
-0.000511 0.0102  0.0136  0.00129  -0.0411***  0.00962  -0.00180  0.0513***  0.00397 
Interactions (0.00961)  (0.00965)  (0.0199)  (0.0101)  (0.0105)  (0.0204)  (0.0104)  (0.00989)  (0.0192) 
5. Controls + 
squared trend 
-0.00737 0.00497  0.0276  0.0161 -0.0428***  0.00711  -0.0235  0.0478***  0.0205 
 (0.0137)  (0.0119)  (0.0239)  (0.0144)  (0.0131)  (0.0248)  (0.0150)  (0.0128)  (0.0241) 
6. Plus trend 
regional  
-0.00764 0.00528  0.0273  0.0121 -0.0431***  0.00659  -0.0197  0.0483***  0.0207 
Interactions (0.0137)  (0.0119)  (0.0239)  (0.0143)  (0.0131)  (0.0247)  (0.0150)  (0.0128)  (0.0241) 
Observations 280,034  241,592  61,911  280,034  241,592  61,911  280,034  241,592 61,911 
Note:  Except for row 1, controls include age and age square, cohabitation and marital status, a dummy indicating whether the individual is the household head, a variable indicating 
the number of children in the household, an immigration dummy, a dummy indicating whether the individual was working the previous year, provinces’ unemployment rate, and 17 
region dummies.  In addition, in rows 4 and 6, these 17 dummies are interacted by the time trend (row 4) and the trend and its squared (row 6). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
42 
 
Table 8.C Placebo Test. Differences in Differences in Differences 
Employment Effects of the Family Friendly Law on Non-Eligible Childbearing-Aged Women, 
By Education Level, LFS 1994-1999 
 
VARIABLES  Employment Permanent  employment  Fixed-Term  employment   
  HS dropout  HS graduate College  HS dropout  HS graduate  College  HS dropout  HS graduate  College 
woman -0.0348***  -0.0889***  -0.0427***  -0.0258***  -0.110***  -0.0756***  -0.00893***  0.0213***  0.0329*** 
 (0.00306)  (0.00649) (0.0125) (0.00318) (0.00711) (0.0140) (0.00297) (0.00549) (0.00956) 
age_23_45 0.0155***  -0.0473***  -0.0695***  -0.0147***  -0.0773***  -0.0785***  0.0302***  0.0300***  0.00903 
 (0.00492)  (0.00655)  (0.0120)  (0.00527)  (0.00753)  (0.0131)  (0.00531)  (0.00597)  (0.00973) 
age_23_45*  -0.0667*** 0.0114  -0.0369  0.0184* 0.0680***  0.0599**  -0.0852***  -0.0566***  -0.0968*** 
Woman  (0.0100) (0.0129)  (0.0252)  (0.00961) (0.0132)  (0.0254)  (0.0101)  (0.0129)  (0.0240) 
Post 1997  0.00556  -0.00761  -0.00602  0.00230  -0.00125  -0.0218  0.00326  -0.00635  0.0158 
 (0.00421)  (0.00764)  (0.0135)  (0.00455)  (0.00867)  (0.0145)  (0.00417)  (0.00722)  (0.0111) 
Post 1997*  -0.0105***  -0.0133*  0.00254  0.00201  -0.000267  0.00243  -0.0125***  -0.0131**  0.000103 
Woman (0.00339)  (0.00758)  (0.0158)  (0.00368)  (0.00842)  (0.0171)  (0.00317)  (0.00609)  (0.0122) 
age_23_45* 0.0148***  0.0141**  0.0355***  -0.00807 0.0110  0.0269**  0.0229***  0.00305  0.00866 
Post 1997  (0.00559)  (0.00682)  (0.0118)  (0.00602)  (0.00779)  (0.0129)  (0.00611)  (0.00622)  (0.00908) 
age_23_45* 0.00116  -0.00663  -0.0437*  0.0137  -0.00964  -0.0117 -0.0125 0.00301  -0.0320 
Post 1997*woman  (0.0105)  (0.0122)  (0.0255)  (0.0103)  (0.0129)  (0.0256)  (0.0109)  (0.0118)  (0.0238) 
Trend -0.0361  -0.0133  0.0152  0.0195  0.000850  0.0298  -0.0556**  -0.0142  -0.0147 
 (0.0244)  (0.0307)  (0.0983)  (0.0218)  (0.0307)  (0.0869)  (0.0221)  (0.0333)  (0.0767) 
Trend square    0.00591*  0.00182  -0.00485  -0.00252  -0.000119  -0.00463  0.00843***  0.00194  -0.000227 
 (0.00339)  (0.00431)  (0.0131)  (0.00301)  (0.00419)  (0.0113)  (0.00311)  (0.00456)  (0.0104) 
Trend*age_23_45* 0.00662  -0.000593  0.0264*  0.00270  0.0135*  -0.0179  0.00392  -0.0141*  0.0443*** 
woman  (0.00619) (0.00722)  (0.0143)  (0.00586)  (0.00725)  (0.0138)  (0.00625)  (0.00756)  (0.0145) 
Trend squared*   -0.000846  0.000479  -0.00160  -2.04e-05  -0.00154*  0.00257  -0.000825  0.00202**  -0.00417** 
age_23_45*women (0.000842)  (0.000900)  (0.00181)  (0.000799)  (0.000916)  (0.00174)  (0.000850)  (0.000954)  (0.00186) 
Observations 204205  152543 37388 204205 152543 37388 204205 152543 37388 
Note:  Same controls as in Table 8.A. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 